The Right to Choose: Why Governments Should Compel the Tobacco Industry To Disclose Their Ingredients by May, H. E. & Wigand, J. S.
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 6
Issue 2 Business Ethics Article 11
6-2005
The Right to Choose: Why Governments Should
Compel the Tobacco Industry To Disclose Their
Ingredients
H. E. May
Central Michigan University
J. S. Wigand
Smoke-Free Kids, Inc
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
May, H. E. and Wigand, J. S. (2005) "The Right to Choose: Why Governments Should Compel the Tobacco Industry To Disclose
Their Ingredients," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, Article 11.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
Essays in Philosophy
A Biannual Journal
Vol. 6, No. 2, June 2005
The Right to Choose: Why Governments Should Compel
the Tobacco Industry To Disclose Their Ingredients
Abstract: Pursuant to the Doctrine of Consumer Sovereignty, we believe that tobacco
companies should be compelled to disclose their ingredients so that the public health
community can make more informed recommendations in order to protect consumer autonomy
and sovereignty. However, a recent decision by the First Circuit precludes such a disclosure
since it would be unduly burdensome to the industry, while granting only minimal gains to the
public. We argue that many of the Court’s key claims rest on a misunderstanding of the
science and chemistry of tobacco products. In our view, a mandatory disclosure of ingredients
would more effectively protect the public interest, whilst posing minimal burdens on the
tobacco industry.
--
And it is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no
Constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair information
of what is being sold.1
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free
market economy.2
Despite the fact that 40 million Americans use tobacco products, many of them do
not know what is inside the cigarette or the tobacco product they ingest. They do
not know the ingredients or the constituents, like tar or nicotine, that are in the
products they use. Consumers do not know what additives are included in the
product ... Tobacco companies do not disclose the specific ingredients in their
products because they don’t have to.3
Tobacco Harms
The health care and societal burdens associated with the use of tobacco are pervasive. Every year in the
United States, 400,000 people lose their lives due to direct tobacco use and an additional 38,000 to
67,500 non-smokers lose their lives because of exposure to secondhand smoke.4 In addition to causing
90% of the diagnosed lung cancer cases, tobacco use also directly contributes to coronary heart disease,
emphysema, and cognitive impairment and disabilities in children (either through in utero exposure or
passive neonatal exposure to secondhand smoke).5 Moreover, tobacco use causes numerous other fatal or
debilitating diseases accounting for 25% of the annual death toll.6 According to the World Health
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Organization (WHO), the number of world-wide deaths caused by tobacco use exceeds 5.1 million per
year and is expected to double by 2025 as the tobacco industry infiltrates developing countries that have
low or non-existent regulatory barriers with regard to their lethal and addictive products.7 According to
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), direct medical expenditures in the U.S. for
tobacco-induced diseases are in excess of $100 billion per annum and cost an additional $140 billion in
workplace productivity.8
How Tobacco Control Policies Prevent Harm
Since the Master Tobacco Settlement Agreement was signed in 1998,9 state, local and international
governments have implemented modest and proactive policies to curb the harmful effects of tobacco.
These policies take the form of smoke-free environments, disclosure policies and labeling regulations
designed to make the consumer more informed about tobacco products, aggressive counter-advertising,
and industry regulations that make exposure to tobacco products ‘safer.’10 These policies mitigate the
health burdens caused by tobacco use. They also change the public’s perception of tobacco products,
thereby ‘denormalizing’ these products.11 Clearly, denormalizing tobacco products, i.e., changing the
public’s perception that these products are a normal part of everyday life, to the perception that tobacco
products are just as lethal as asbestos and hexavalent chromium, is integral to diminishing the health and
societal burdens caused by tobacco. If the public does not understand the true dangers of smoking and
exposure to secondhand smoke, they will continue to engage in harmful behavior, with no decrease in
mortality and morbidity rates in sight.
Fortunately, policy makers understand that they have the power and the responsibility to educate
and protect the public with respect to tobacco products. Tobacco control policies have been proven
to denormalize these products and subsequently mitigate the health burdens that they cause. For
example, since 1988, when the state of California implemented aggressive tobacco control practices
such as smoke free environments, there has been a 19.5% reduction in lung cancer rates over the
period of 1988-1999.12 When Helena, Montana went smoke free, there was a statistically significant
reduction in acute coronary heart disease in non-smokers exposed to secondhand or passive
smoke.13 After Canada mandated that all tobacco packages sold in Canada carry a graphic warning
on 50% of the tobacco product label area,14 the public’s understanding and perception has changed,
resulting in the saving of at least 3000 lives.15 Other tobacco control programs by Health Canada
have resulted in a significant reduction in smoking prevalence in the population of Canada from
24.3% in 1994 to 17.8% in 2003.16
One of the fundamental duties of government is to implement policies that protect those
fundamental interests that are necessary for an autonomous life. Among these interests, of course, is
the interest to be free from undue harm. If individuals could freely inflict harm on others without
consequence, autonomy would be impossible. Also crucial to autonomy is the interest to be
informed so that one can make a rational choice from a number of competing alternatives. This
interest is also recognized by the Doctrine of Consumer Sovereignty, according to which consumers
can only dictate market preferences if adequately informed. Tobacco control policies are necessary
to protect both the interest to be free from harm, and the interest to be informed. Some protect the
former, whereas others protect the latter.
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Fire Safe Cigarette Acts & Smoke Free Environments:
Tobacco Control Policies Designed To Protect Citizens From Undue Harm
In his classic work, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that the only time a government is justified
in interfering with an individual’s liberty is when that individual is causing harm to others. As Mill
famously says, government is not justified in interfering with an individual’s liberty if that
individual is causing harm to oneself:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant ... The only part of the conduct of any one,
for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.17
Although Mill is speaking of government’s interference with the liberty of individuals, often
government interferes with the liberty of corporations to prevent harm to citizens. Indeed, some of
the governmental regulations on the tobacco industry can be understood as stemming from
government’s duty to protect citizens’ interest to be free from undue harm. New York’s recent law
prohibiting the sale of any cigarette that is not ‘fire-safe,’ is a case in point.18 According to the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), smoking materials (i.e., cigarettes, cigars, pipes, etc.)
are the leading cause of fire deaths and the third leading cause of fire injuries in the United States.19
In 1999, there were 167,700 fires associated with smoking materials, resulting in 807 deaths, 2,193
injuries and $559.1 million in property damage.20 Non-smokers such as children and fire fighters
are often killed in fires caused by cigarettes. New York’s law prohibits tobacco companies from
selling any cigarette that does not self-extinguish if not actively ‘puffed on,’ thereby eliminating the
ignition propensity of the cigarette. Presumably, this law will prevent fires caused by cigarettes that
drop or fall because the smoker falls asleep.21 In preventing such fires, New York’s law protects
innocents such as children and fire-fighters from the undue harm resulting from a cigarette fire.
The rationale for mandated smoke-free environments can also be understood as stemming from
government’s duty to protect citizens from undue harm. By smoking in a public place, a smoker
indeed harms other innocent parties by forcing them to inhale known carcinogens and
cardiovascular toxicants. Secondhand or passive smoke contains more than 4,000 toxic chemicals in
various states of matter, such as carbon monoxide, benzene, benzo(a)pyrene, nitrosamines, and
formaldehyde. These chemical toxicants are carcinogenic and etiological factors in the pathology of
tobacco use, and are responsible for a myriad of tobacco-induced diseases, such as lung cancer,
coronary heart disease and SIDS.22 Even Philip Morris has acknowledged that secondhand smoke
causes harm to innocent non-smokers. Its website states: "Philip Morris USA believes that the
conclusions of public health officials concerning environmental tobacco smoke are sufficient to
warrant measures to regulate smoking in public places."23
Labeling Regulations & Disclosure Policies:
Tobacco Control Policies Designed to Protect A Consumer’s Right to Know
As we have seen, some tobacco control policies protect citizens from undue harm. Other tobacco
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control policies protect the autonomy of the citizen-consumer by forcing companies to provide the
consumer with important information about the product. The moral mandate to protect the citizen-
consumer's interest in full and adequate information is clearly captured by Kant’s moral theory,
which exhorts us never to treat human beings as mere means, but only as ends in themselves:
[M]an and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they
concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an
end... So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in
every case as an end withal, never as means only.24
According to Kant, the cheating husband is morally reprehensible since by lying to his wife about
his whereabouts, he prevents her from making a free choice about whether to stay with him. In
effect, he coerces her to stay with him with his lies, and thus uses her for his own selfish ends.
Similarly, when a corporation withholds information about its products from the public when a
reasonable person’s decision to use that product would change upon learning that information, the
corporation coerces the public into using its products, and treats the public as a mere means to
profit. To withhold relevant information or to lie to a human being is to manipulate that person, and
to use him or her as means to one’s selfish ends or personal gain. The only way to treat a human
being as an end in him or herself is to tell the truth, and disclose all information so that that
individual can act freely, rationally, and responsibly.
The moral mandate to protect the citizen-consumer’s interest in full and adequate information is
also recognized by the Law of Contracts. If Smith wants to buy a race horse, and agrees to buy one
from Jones, and if Jones fails to disclose to Smith that the horse has a form of cancer that, in 3
months time, will prevent it from racing, then the law states that the contract between Jones and
Smith is voidable, and hence that Smith can get his money back. Importantly, even if the
misrepresentation is not willful, and is, in other words, ‘innocent,’ the court will invalidate the
contract. For example, if Smith asks Jones “does your horse have any illnesses?” and if Jones
honestly (but wrongly) believes that his horse is completely healthy, the court will invalidate the
contract.25
According to the contractual view of the manufacturer’s duties to consumers, the only duties that a
manufacturer has to a consumer are the basic non-negotiable duties recognized by the Law of
Contracts, namely, the duty to disclose, the duty to comply, the duty not to misrepresent, and the
duty not to coerce or use duress.26 The contract view places minimal duties on the manufacturer
since all the manufacturer needs to do is meet its basic legal duties, governed by the Law of
Contracts. According to the contractual view, the duty to exercise due care and to make their
products as safe as possible is absent, since the fully informed consumer should have the choice to
decide whether or not to “pay more for safety.” Even such a minimalist view of a manufacturer’s
duties to consumers stresses the importance of fully informing the consumer.
There are also economic considerations that justify laws or regulations that force a corporation to
provide information about its products to the public. In a free market, consumers must have full
information about the products that they may consume in order for the market to operate efficiently.
It is only when consumers have information that they can be said to make a choice to consume a
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good, and it is only when consumers can choose to consume a good that the market can be said to
be free. Thus, informing the consumer can be justified on both Kantian and Utilitarian moral
grounds. A Kantian would support informing the consumer because doing so protects her or his
integrity and autonomy. A Utilitarian would support informing the consumer because doing so
maximizes the efficiency of the market.27 And if we adopt the contractual view of the
manufacturer’s duties to consumers, the manufacturer must disclose all material information about
the product as a precondition of valid, binding contract with the consumer.
When government compels a corporation to provide information to the public, it does so in order to
protect the citizens’ interest to be adequately informed and to protect the efficiency of the market. A
consumer cannot reasonably be said to be making a choice unless he/she has all of the relevant
information about that product, and the market cannot be said to be free unless its goods and
services are dictated by consumer choice.28
The Need for Disclosure Policies
Disclosure policies that compel the tobacco industry to publicize its ingredients are virtually non-
existent in the United States. In 1986, a federal disclosure law was passed forcing tobacco
companies to disclose their ingredients to the U.S Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). However, the ingredient lists are not provided on a brand-by-brand basis and are not made
public. Texas and Minnesota also have disclosure laws, but Texas’ law does not require public
release, and Minnesota’s law requires tobacco companies to report only certain chemical
compounds that are known health hazards (e.g., ammonia, arsenic, cadmium, formaldehyde, and
lead).29 In contradistinction to the United States, in Canada, the province of British Columbia
requires tobacco companies to list, by brand, all ingredients and additives in every brand of
cigarette or cigarette tobacco that they sell in British Columbia. This list is available to the public,
and with the help of the Internet, consumers may do a search of ingredients by brand.30
Currently, the American public is not only ignorant about the ingredients in tobacco products, but
is misled about their nature. Contrary to the public perception that tobacco products are ‘natural’
products that were first cultivated by Native Americans, the tobacco materials used in cigarettes are
scientifically engineered from field to consumer, utilizing over 599 intentional additives as well as
numerous unintentional toxic additives derived from agronomic and manufacturing processes.31
Clearly, the public interest would be served if the intentional and unintentional additives in tobacco
products were publicized.32 The publication of ingredient lists would help to change the public’s
false perception that tobacco is a ‘natural product,’ thereby helping to denormalize the product.
Moreover, with a complete list of ingredients, the public health and scientific community could
make more informed public health recommendations to policy makers in order to enable consumers
to make more informed decisions about which tobacco products (if any) to consume.
Massachusetts’ Disclosure Act
In 1998, the state of Massachusetts understood the importance of a full disclosure policy and
attempted to pass an act that would require tobacco companies to submit all of the additives in all
cigarettes, snuffs, and chewing tobaccos sold in the state.33 Specifically, the act required
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manufacturers to list, by relative amount, all ingredients besides tobacco, water, or reconstituted
tobacco sheet.34 If the relevant agency determined that any of the ingredients posed a health risk to
Massachusetts’ citizens, it could publicize the ingredients.35 The objective of Massachusetts’
Disclosure Act (hereinafter ‘MDA’) was to “help consumers make more informed choices about the
tobacco products they choose to consume,” and to affect “greater public awareness about the
potential health effects of tobacco additives.”36 In other words, the MDA was designed to protect
the citizens’ interest in full information, thereby making autonomous choice regarding tobacco a
reality rather than a mere political term.
In 2002, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found the MDA to be unconstitutional because it
resulted in an uncompensated ‘taking’ of the industry’s trade secrets.37 The Court held that since
ingredient lists are trade secrets, then insofar as the MDA allowed the state to make these lists
available to the public if “doing so could protect public health,” it constituted an uncompensated
taking of intellectual property and hence violated the Fifth Amendment.38 In the end, the Court
decided that although Massachusetts’ objective of promoting and protecting public health was
indeed laudable, it was unnecessary for the MDA to require tobacco companies to submit all of the
ingredients for each of their tobacco products.
There is no simple test for Courts to use when determining whether a regulation such as the MDA
constitutes a “taking.” Rather, Courts look at each regulation individually, and conduct an ad hoc,
factual inquiry.39 There are several factors that the Courts look to when deciding whether a specific
regulation is a taking, but none of these factors of dispositive.40 These factors include: 1) the
economic impact of the regulation, 2) the character of the government action, and 3) the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations.41 The First
Circuit found that the MDA had a tremendous economic impact on the tobacco industry, that the
burdens of the MDA to the industry outweighed any benefits to the public, and that it interfered
with the industry’s reasonable investment backed expectations. Thus, the First Circuit found that the
MDA constituted a taking and hence violated the Fifth Amendment. As we will show, the Court’s
arguments are problematic and rest on a misunderstanding of the science and chemistry of tobacco
products.
Why ‘Reverse Engineering’ Would Not Have a Tremendous Economic Impact on the
Industry.
The Court concluded that the MDA would have a tremendous economic impact on the tobacco
industry because it compromises the integrity of the ‘secret formula’ characteristic of each brand.
Recognizing that a company might acquire the secret formula of a competitor’s brand by reverse
engineering, the Court held that a company could reverse engineer a competitor’s formula if the
MDA made public the ingredient lists of each brand. Writing for the Court, Judge Torruella states:
The evidence shows that public disclosure of the [tobacco companies’] ingredient lists,
even in part, will make it much easier to reverse engineer these formulas. If competitors
can obtain these formulas, they can replicate [the tobacco companies’] products,
undermining the value of [these] brands ... While it is impossible to predict the exact
economic impact that the Disclosure Act will have, it is potentially tremendous.”42
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There are two claims being made here. First, the Court implies that an ingredient list would provide
the ‘missing link’ that would enable a company to reverse engineer its competitor’s products.
Second, the Court claims that the MDA could have a disastrous economic impact on the industry:
once a company can reverse engineer its competitors’ product, X, then the value of X would be
significantly undermined. Both of these claims are erroneous.
In 1987, in an intensive and coordinated project entitled “Adverb” initiated and culminating in
1992, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation (B&W), the nation’s third largest tobacco
company and part of the world's second largest tobacco concern, British American Tobacco Plc
(BAT), was able to reverse Philip Morris’ ‘Marlboro’ brand, the world’s largest selling brand,
without any specific additive or ingredient disclosures. The reverse engineering was accomplished
through sophisticated analytical methods and state of the art analytical instrumentation that
delineated the total cigarette design from the raw leaf components to flavor additives and
ingredients. When the results of this reverse engineering project were incorporated into B&W non-
menthol brands and tested in a statistically relevant consumer product testing, the reverse
engineered product and Marlboro tested equally across a myriad of consumer attributes. Thus, the
Court’s fear that the MDA would harm a manufacturer by making it easier for its competitors to
steal its ‘secret formulas’ is unfounded. The fact is, a competitor can learn the secret formula
without a list of ingredients. Indeed, it has already been done.
The Court’s claim that the ability to reverse engineer a competitor’s product, X, would significantly
undermine X’s value is also problematic. This argument fails to recognize the aspect of a tobacco
product that gives it is ‘true’ value, namely, its image. The success of a brand such as Marlboro
rests predominately with its exorbitant and extensive consumer product advertising and promotion,
not on its proprietary additive or ingredient cocktail. In 1998 according to FTC data, the tobacco
industry spent $6.7 billion in annual advertising and promotion of their products and over $11.22
billion in 2001.43 In 2003 it was estimated that this amount now eclipses $14 billion. In contrast,
the de novo development of a new blend costs are approximately $1-3 million.
Importantly, 88% of people who smoke today began smoking before the age of 18. Adolescents do
not sample a variety of cigarettes, and decide on one that has the best ‘taste.’ Rather, the leading
factor in youth initiation of tobacco use is advertising and promotion, followed by price and finally
by peer pressure.44 86% of youth smokers begin by smoking one of the three most heavily
advertised products and continue through life smoking that brand.45 Thus, the product recipe is not
the key to product success. Rather, the value and success of a cigarette brand largely consists in the
advertising and promotion dollars spent linking a sophisticated scientifically engineered product
with sophisticated advertising that glamorizes the product so as to appeal to adolescent needs.46
Tobacco companies indeed understand this, and prior to the Master Settlement Agreement, they
intentionally created advertising that targeted adolescents. And it worked. One of the icons of
smoking, Joe Camel, was found to have more recognition amongst three year olds (30%) and six
year olds (91%) than Ronald McDonald or Mickey Mouse.47 Consider B&W’s ‘Richland’ brand.
This brand was designed with packaging very similar to Marlboro, containing a red ‘chevron.’ It is
no accident that ‘Richland’ contains the same number of letters as ‘Marlboro.’
When the Court refers to the disclosure of ingredient lists as a ‘tremendous [economic] loss,” we
believe the claim is unfounded. The fact is, a forced disclosure of ingredients would have little, if
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any, effect on the value of a company’s brand. This explains why the tobacco industry originally
agreed to a provision in a 1997 settlement agreement between 39 Attorneys General and the tobacco
industry, to publicly disclose their ingredients subject to FDA regulations.48 The 1997 agreement
was subject to Congressional approval that never materialized.49 Importantly, however, the industry
agreed to publicly disclose the ingredients in tobacco products, by brand. Obviously, the industry
would not have agreed to such a provision if they believed that public disclosure would result in a
tremendous economic loss. Rather, the industry agreed to a disclosure provision because they
understood that publicly disclosing ingredients would have little, if any effect on the value of their
products. As we have seen, the most significant value of a cigarette brand involves its ‘image,’
which is created by advertising and promotion dollars. Consequently, the harm suffered by the
industry in disclosing its ingredients would not be ‘tremendous,’ but would be negligible when
compared to the public good that would be served by such a disclosure.
Why the Burdens of the MDA to the Tobacco Industry
Do Not Outweigh the Benefits to Public Health
The Court also erred in concluding that the burdens caused by the MDA to the industry outweigh
its benefit to public health. According to the Court, “it is undisputed that most of the added
ingredients [in tobacco products] are approved for consumption in food or ‘Generally Recognized
As Safe’ by the Food and Drug Administration.”50 The Court reasoned that since most of the
ingredients in tobacco products are safe, then a law which forces tobacco companies to disclose all
of their ingredients imposes an unnecessary burden on the industry. According to the Court,
Massachusetts only needs to compel the industry to disclose ingredients that are known hazards to
human health in order to protect public health and safety. Thus, in order to protect public health,
Massachusetts should have adopted a narrower law such as that adopted by Minnesota, which
requires the industry to disclose a merely partial list of ingredients that are known to pose health
risks. 51 Indeed, the Court found that the harm caused to the industry by forcing it to disclose all of
its ingredients, far outweighed the purported protection of public health. According to the Court,
“[t]he tremendous individual loss [to the tobacco industry] is simply not justified by such a
speculative public gain.”52
The Court’s assumption that most of the ingredients in tobacco products are safe because most of
these ingredients are on the GRAS (“Generally Recognized as Safe”) list is unfortunate and reveals
a misunderstanding regarding the toxicity of the ingredients in tobacco products. The GRAS list
was never intended or expected to apply to additives or ingredients that undergo a series of
pyrosynthetic changes when combusted or pyrolyzed with tobacco at temperatures from 350°C to
950°C.53 To claim that cigarette additives are safe because most of them appear on the GRAS list
misleads the consumer about the safety of these products. This is so for two different reasons. First,
combustion toxicants are not subject to any of the biochemical detoxification or biotransformation
processes associated with ingestion or dermal applications of additives in food or cosmetics.
Second, some ingredients while innocuous in an unburned state become quite harmful when
pyrolyzed.
Biodetoxification Systems: The Body vs. The Lungs
Foods and cosmetics are “filtered” by the body’s detoxification systems, whereas the lungs lack any
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detoxification system. Therefore, a chemical may be “safe” if applied or ingested because the
body’s detoxification systems disarm the potential harm that it may cause. But the very same
chemical may be dangerous if inhaled through the lungs, since the lungs lack the capacity to disarm
the potential of this chemical to do harm.
The fact that the substances that appear on the GRAS list are designated to be used in foods and
cosmetics/toiletries is important because ingredients that are ingested have a unique and different
effect on the body than ingredients that are pyrolyzed and then inhaled. The biochemical digestion
process of the approved additives has multiple opportunities to be detoxified in the body’s
biochemical systems through biotransformation and biodetoxification. In the lungs, on the other
hand, these same chemical reactions do not occur. This is because unlike the lungs, the body,
through its biochemical systems, is able to distinguish different types of toxic substances based on
their “functional groups” (i.e., the complex molecular structure that is characteristic of each
chemical). For example, the body will metabolize a molecular structure known as an “aliphatic
chain” more efficiently than it will metabolize a more complex structure known as an “aromatic
ring.” This is because the former structure comprises a straight chain of saturated chemical bonds,
whereas the latter structure is a cyclical chain of unsaturated chemical bonds. The lungs, however,
not only lack the discriminatory capacity possessed by the body’s detoxification system, even
worse, the lungs lack any capacity to identify the molecular structure of a toxic substance. Whereas
the body has a variety of detoxification processes that correspond to the various molecular structures
found in toxic substances, the lungs have none.
When introduced into the body, therefore, a toxic substance will meet with biochemical defenses,
but when introduced into the lungs, a toxic substance will inevitably inflict damage, since the lungs
have no defenses at all. The lungs are a “chink” in the body’s “armor” and once a toxic substance
gets through this chink, it wreaks maximum damage by going directly into the bloodstream, and
ultimately to the heart and the brain. Biodetoxification systems make substances less toxic to the
body and less likely to cause human biotoxicity. Unfortunately, the lungs lack biodetoxification
systems. Consequently, it does not follow that a substance is safe to inhale, just because it is safe
to ingest or apply.
How Ingredients Change During Pyrolysis
When burned, seemingly harmless additives do not maintain their original integrity but change in
chemical and physical form and combine with other combusted products to form highly toxic
compounds. For example, glycerol, which appears on the FDA’s GRAS list, is used in tobacco
products as a humectant, to keep the tobacco moist. However, when pyrolyzed, glycerol becomes
the highly toxic product called acrolein.54 Additionally, when the sugars in seemingly innocuous
additives like licorice, chocolate, honey, and simple sugars are burned, acetaldehyde is formed.
When burned in conjunction with nicotine, acetaldehyde intensifies the effect that nicotine has on
the brain. Put bluntly, acetaldehyde facilitates, enhances and intensifies the brain’s addiction to
nicotine. Seemingly harmless ingredients, when burned in conjunction with nicotine, make the
smoker more dependent on nicotine.55
Why a Partial Disclosure of only Select Ingredients is not Sufficient to Protect Public Health
Because the First Circuit believes that most of the ingredients in tobacco products are on the GRAS
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list, and are hence safe, they claim that only a partial disclosure of ingredients such as that
mandated by the states of Texas and Minnesota is sufficient to protect public health. As the Court
writes, “[t]here is no evidence that regimes similar to those adopted by Texas and Minnesota, or
some combination thereof, would not achieve the goals which [Massachusetts claims] underlie the
requirements of the Disclosure Act.”56 But as discussed above, this argument is problematic. First,
it ignores the fact that the lungs lack the biodetoxification systems possessed by the body, and
hence that a substance that is safe to ingest or apply is not necessarily safe to inhale. Second, it
ignores the fact that even though an ingredient is on the GRAS list, it could become highly toxic
when burned. Third, it ignores the fact that when a seemingly innocuous ingredient is burned in
conjunction with other ingredients, a highly toxic compound could result. Finally, this argument
ignores the fact that the brain’s dependence on nicotine is strengthened and intensified when
harmless sugars are burned.
According to the Court, disclosing merely a partial list of ingredients is sufficient to adequately
protect public health. In fact, the Court lauds Minnesota’s Law as a model “partial disclosure” act.
Minnesota’s law requires tobacco companies to publicly disclose only those ingredients that are
‘known’ carcinogens, namely ammonia, arsenic, cadmium, formaldehyde, and lead.57 This list does
not include either glycerol or acrolein. Nor does it contain acetaldehyde-producing ingredients such
as cocoa, honey, or licorice. For the reasons articulated above, only a complete list of ingredients is
sufficient to protect public health.
The Court actually provides an additional objection to a law mandating complete disclosure. In their
view, a complete ingredient list might actually jeopardize public health, since truly dangerous
ingredients ‘might become buried in the middle of lengthy lists’ thereby causing the consumer to
overlook them:
If entire ingredient lists are published, those ingredients which might pose a danger to
health may very well be buried in the middle of lengthy lists. It appears from a lay
perspective that making targeted disclosures of certain ingredients and ingredient
groupings might be a more effective public health strategy.58
This comment reveals a misunderstanding about the function of ingredient lists. It is not that
laypersons would read these lists without assistance. Rather, public health officials who are charged
with protecting public health would read these lists and design appropriate public awareness
campaigns, as well as advise policy makers concerned with protecting public health. Granted,
without the aid of public health officials, the mere publication of complete ingredient lists would
probably not be the most effective way to protect public health. However, these lists would be
primarily read by public health officials. These officials, with the assistance of conscientious
scientists, would be able to research and test these ingredients, and could then provide information
to more effectively protect public health.
As we have seen, the Court errs in concluding that the MDA is too broad, and hence unduly
burdensome to the industry. Only with a complete list of ingredients can the public health and
scientific communities better educate the public and make more informed public health
recommendations to policy makers. Clearly, the benefit to the public caused by the MDA outweighs
the burdens it would cause to the tobacco industry.
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Why the Industry’s Investment Backed Expectations were Unreasonable
Thus far we have seen that, relative to the public interest served, the tobacco industry would suffer
negligible harm if it were forced to disclose its ingredients. We have also seen that 1) since the
lungs lack the biodetoxification systems possessed by the body, and 2) since the chemical
composition of seemingly harmless cigarette ingredients significantly changes when burned, a law
compelling partial disclosure would not be sufficient to protect the public interest. In closing, let us
critique the Court’s argument that the MDA interfered with the industry’s ‘reasonable investment
backed expectations.’ While numerous articles have attempted to analyze the concept of a
‘reasonable investment backed expectation,’ at the very least, ‘reasonable investment backed
expectations’ are legally justified financial expectations. In other words, if Smith acquires property
that is subject to regulation such that one cannot do X to that property, and if Smith buys the
property as an investment hoping to make money by doing X, then Smith does not have a
reasonable investment backed expectation.59 On the other hand, if Smith acquires property that is
not subject to regulation Y, and if Smith buys the property as an investment hoping to make money
by doing Y, then Smith does have a reasonable investment backed expectation.
Reasonable investment backed expectations are one of several factors considered by courts when
determining whether a regulation is tantamount to a taking of one’s property.60 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed that the tobacco industry had ‘reasonable investment backed expectations’
that their formula would remain secret. Thus, since forcing the industry to disclose their ingredients
would frustrate this expectation, the court found further evidence that the MDA worked an
unconstitutional taking against the industry.
We question whether the tobacco industry’s investment backed expectations were ‘reasonable.’
Smith’s investment backed expectation is only reasonable if he acts legally and avoids fraud. A
pending $280 billion Federal RICO law suit against the tobacco industry argues that since the
profits of the tobacco company were acquired through fraudulent means (e.g., lying to the public
about whether nicotine was addictive, and manipulating nicotine levels so as to facilitate addiction),
then the industry has been ‘unjustly enriched’ and therefore needs to be disgorged of any profits
that were attained through fraudulent means. While a decision on this case is still pending, the
industry’s own documents clearly evidence a desire to deceive the public about the health risks of
smoking. For example, the tobacco industry and their agents launched a coordinated pubic relations
campaign in the early 1950’s to refute the body of evidence showing that smoking caused disease.61
And in 1994, the CEO’s of the seven major tobacco companies testified in front of Congress that
nicotine was not addictive and that tobacco use was no more dangerous than eating Twinkies.62
This is in contradiction to the industry’s own documents.
The industry’s desire to deceive the public clearly undermines the ‘reasonableness’ of their
investment backed expectations. As the Court notes “... not every investment deserves protection ...
some investors will inevitably be disappointed.’63 Indeed, an industry that profits from knowingly
defrauding the public should be ‘disappointed’ when their duplicity is discovered, and government
acts to regulate this industry in order to protect the interests of citizen-consumers. When the
Sarbanes-Oxley act was signed into law in 2002, for instance, the government responded to a wave
of corporate fraud scandals that harmed investors by both regulating the accounting practices of
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public companies and by imposing heightened responsibilities onto corporate officers and
management. It would have been preposterous to argue that since public companies had not hitherto
been subject to such regulations, they had reasonable, investment backed expectations that their
accounting practices would proceed without government regulation. A company’s fraudulent
activity nullifies the reasonableness of their investment-backed expectations. Thus, if the
government finds that the tobacco industry engaged in fraud, then it would be difficult for the
industry to sustain the argument that they reasonably expected their ingredients to remain secret.
And even if the court does not find that the industry engaged in fraud, the fact that the industry
agreed to disclose their ingredients as part of the 1997 Settlement Agreement undermines the
argument that mandatory disclosure would unduly frustrate their reasonable expectations.64
Conclusion
As we have seen, the First Circuit’s decision that the MDA constituted a taking rests on several
problematic conclusions. In contradistinction to what the Court concludes, a public disclosure of
ingredients would not have a tremendous economic impact on the industry, would result in public
benefits that outweigh any burdens to the industry, and would not frustrate any reasonable,
investment backed expectations.
From a legal point of view, the controversy surrounding the MDA pits an industry’s interest in
confidentiality against the consumer’s interest to be fully informed. The First Circuit seems to agree
that in the case of conflict, the latter interest trumps the former. In the case of the MDA, however,
the Court found that the MDA was overreaching and did not adequately protect the consumer’s
interest to be fully informed. We have shown that the First Circuit’s arguments are weak and rest on
a misunderstanding of the chemistry of tobacco products. A partial list of ingredients is not
sufficient to protect public health; the threat of ‘reverse engineering’ is a paper tiger, and the claim
that MDA interfered with the industry’s ‘reasonable investment backed expectations’ conflicts with
our policies against fraud and unjust enrichment. The MDA was not overreaching and would have
adequately protected the consumer’s interests.
With a proper understanding of the science and chemistry of tobacco products, both policy makers
and judges should see that the disclosure policies would protect the public interest, whilst posing
minimal burdens on the tobacco industry. Indeed, a full disclosure of ingredients is necessary to
fully protect consumer sovereignty. If the U.S. Courts continue to find laws such as the MDA
overreaching and unduly burdensome to industry, this would pose serious problems to the Doctrine
of Consumer Sovereignty, to the contractual view of the manufacturer’s duties to consumers, and,
in fact, to any view to which a fully informed consumer is essential. In the wake of a legal system
that identifies ingredients that pose a real threat to human health as “trade secrets” thereby making a
list of such ingredients “confidential,” those who believe that consumers have a right to be fully
informed should be concerned.
H.E. May
Central Michigan University
J.S. Wigand
Smoke-Free Kids, Inc.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
Notes
1. Corn Prods. Ref Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431- 432. (1919).
2. 15 U.S.C. §1451.
3. Floor statement of Senator Michael DeWine (D, Ohio), on introducing tobacco legislation with
Senator Ted Kennedy (D, Massachusetts), May 20, 2004.
4. Testimony of Richard H. Carmona, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.C.S., US Surgeon General, before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, US House of Representatives, June 3, 2003; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, State Highlights 2002: Impact and Opportunity, April 2002; Tobacco Control
Monograph No. 10, NIH Publication No. 99-4645, 1999; CDC, Annual Smoking-Attributable
Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost and Economic Costs-United States 1995-1999, MMWR,
April 11, 2002; www.cdc.gov/tobacco; see also Mokdad, Ali. H., et al. 2004. Actual Causes of
Death in the United States, 2000, JAMA, 291 (10).
5. DiFranza, Joseph, et al. 2002. Prenatal and Postnatal Environmental Tobacco Smoke Exposure
and Children's Health, Pediatrics, 113 (4): 1007-1015; Hofhuis, W. et al. 2003. Adverse Health
Effects of Prenatal and Postnatal Smoke Exposure on Children, Arch Dis Child, 88:1086-1090.
Ernst, Monique. et al. 2001. Behavioral and Neural Consequences of Prenatal exposure to Nicotine,
J. AM. Acad. Adolesc. Psychiatry, 40(6): 630-641; Weitzman, Michael, et al. 2002. The effects of
tobacco exposure on children's behavioral and cognitive functioning: Implications for clinical and
public health policy and future research, Neurotoxicology and Teratology, 24: 397-406.
6. US Department of Health and Human Services. 1989. Reducing the Health Consequences of
Smoking: 25 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General; US Department of Health and
Human Services. 1994. Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon
General; US Department of Health and Human Services. 2000. Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of
the Surgeon General; US Department of Health and Human Services. 2001. Women and Smoking:
A Report of the Surgeon General.
7. Mckay, Judith and Ericksen, Michael. 2002. World Health Organization, The Tobacco Atlas;
www.who.int/tobacco/statistics/tobacco-atlas/en/; WHO, Tobacco Free Initiative,
www.who/int/tobacco/en, August 17, 2004; European Commission, Smoking and the Environment:
Action and Attitudes, November 2003; see also Carter, David, et al. 1998. Report of the Scientific
Committee on Tobacco and Health. www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/doh/tobacco/letter.htm.
8. Zhang, Xiuian. et al. Summer 1999. Cost of Smoking to the Medicare Program, 1993. Health
Care Financing Review, 20(4): 179-196.
9. The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was an historic settlement between the seven
major tobacco companies and 46 state Attorneys General. In addition to providing financial
recovery to the states for back medical costs associated with tobacco related illnesses, the MSA also
placed restrictions on tobacco advertising, created a public tobacco education fund, and forced the
to be used for youth tobacco prevention -- the fundamental etiological factor for the lost lives and
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
work force productivity. For more on the MSA see: "Summary of the Attorneys General Master
Tobacco Settlement Agreement", National Conference of State Legislatures, March 1999;
www.ncsl.org/statefed/tmsasumm.htm; see also www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/settlements,
August 17, 2004.
10. In the United States, states like California, New York, Florida and cities like Helena, Montana,
Lexington, Kentucky and Dallas, Texas made public venues such as restaurants and bars, smoke
free. In Nebraska, state prisons are now smoke-free. In Europe, the countries of Ireland and Norway
are smoke free. And Canada and the state of New York have both passed legislation mandating that
all cigarettes sold meet a ‘fire safe’ or reduced ignition propensity standard. EU Tobacco Products
Act, Article 3b(3),"Regulation concerning lists of tobacco ingredients", April 2003, see also Canada
Gazette Part I, Cigarette Ignition Propensity Regulations, Statutory Authority Tobacco Act, 26 June
2004; see also New York Cigarette Fire Safety Statute, L 2000, Chapter 284, Executive Law Article
6-C, Section 156-C, New York Cigarette Fire safety Regulations 19 NYCRR 429.
11. Rather than perceiving smoking to be what it truly is, a lethal activity for both the person who
engages in it, and for those who are proximal to the smoker, the industry has convinced many that
smoking is a natural and normal activity in which we have a right to engage.
12. Barnoya, Joaquin and Glantz, Stanton. 2004. Association of the California tobacco control
program with declines in lung cancer, Cancer Causes and Control, 15: 689-695.
13. These Helena findings prompted the CDC to issue a stark warning in their Weekly Mortality
and Morbidity Rate (WMMR) April 2004 on any exposure to secondhand smoke. These findings
are further supported and corroborated by a recently published peer reviewed articles on the effects
of passive smoke on coronary heart disease and stroke in non-smoking males. Pechacek, Terry. et
al. 2004. Commentary: How acute and reversible are the cardiovascular risks of secondhand smoke?
British Journal of Medicine, 328: 980-983; Sargent, Richard, et al. 2004. Reduced incidence of
admissions for myocardial infarction associated public smoking ban: before and after, British
Journal of Medicine, 328: 977-980; Ong, Michael, K. and Glantz, Stanton. 2004. Cardiovascular
health and economic effects of smoke-free workplace, The American Journal of Medicine, 117 (1):
32-38.
14. http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/T-11.5/text.htm, see also Canada Gazette (the only official medium
for the publication of legally binding decisions of the Government of Canada).
15. Health Canada, www.hc.sc.ca, See also,
www.hc.sc.gc.ca/hecessecsc/tobacco/research/ctums/index.html.
16. Canadian Tobacco Use Survey (CTUMS), Statistics Canada, 2003, www.hc.ca,
www.statca/Daily/English/040615/d040615b.htm.
17. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Edited by Elizabeth Rapaport. (Hackett, 1978), 9.
18. See NY Cigarette Fire Safety Statute, L 200, Chapter 284, Executive Law 6-C, Section 156-c,
Cigarette Fire Safety Regulations, 19 NYCRR 429.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
19. http://www.nfpa.org/Research/NFPAFactSheets/Smoking/Smoking.asp.
20. id.
21. There are a variety of technologies that can be used to make cigarettes ‘fire safe.’ Thinner
cigarettes, because they have a reduced mass consequently have a reduced ignition propensity.
Think of a fire that has a single twig as fuel, versus a fire that has several large logs. The less fuel
for the fire, the less ability that fuel has to transfer its energy to another source. One can also affect
the ignition propensity of a cigarette by modifying the paper that surrounds the tobacco column.
One can make the cigarette paper less porous, thereby decreasing the flow of oxygen to support
combustion. One can also modify the paper so that its porosity decreases at intervals. Think of these
less porous intervals as "speed bumps" which slow down the rate of burn of a cigarette. If a
cigarette is not being actively smoked, it continues to burn until it hits a "speed bump," and when it
does, the cigarette does not have enough ignition propensity, enough "juice," to ignite an object
with which it is contiguous. See also US Consumer Safety Commission, August 1993. Final
Report, Fire Safe Cigarette Act of 1990.
22. Defined by official recognition by state or federal governments, or by supra-governmental
agencies, such as International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), Deutche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), US EPA, OSHA and United Nations/ACGIH.
23. www.philipmorrisusa.com/policies_practices/public_place_smoking.asp.
24. Kant, Immanuel. 1959. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Lewis White
Beck. Bobbs-Merrill. 46-47.
25. If, however, Fred can prove that Barney “assumed the risk,” and purchased the horse after
having an opportunity to inspect the horse on his own, the court may uphold the contract. See
Nester v. Michigan Land & Iron Co. , 37 NW 278 (1888).
26. Velasquez, Manuel. Business Ethics: Concepts & Cases. (Prentice Hall, 2002). 339-348.
27. The beginning of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) acknowledges both the Kantian
and Utilitarian justifications when it refers to the ‘fairness’ and ‘efficiency’ that result from
providing information to consumers:
Informed Consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free market
economy. Packages and their labels should enable consumers to obtain accurate
information as to the quantity of he contents and should facilitate value comparisons. 15
U.S.C. §1451.
The FPLA does not apply to tobacco products, which explains why we do not see a list of
ingredients on cigarette packages.
28. Thus, the Tobacco Act of Canada forces tobacco companies to include graphic warnings
depicting the pathology of tobacco use on 50% of the label on a pack of cigarettes. For example, the
Canadian government believes graphic warnings on tobacco products, such as an image of diseased
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
lungs, are necessary to counteract the slick multi-billion dollar marketing campaigns that the
industry uses to obfuscate the hazards of its product. Presumably, the Canadian government
believes that exposing a consumer to an unavoidably noticeable and disturbing warning, helps them
to hear ‘all sides,’ so as to facilitate a more rational and informed choice to consume the product.
29. See Minn. Stat. § 461.17.
30. See, “http://www.healthservices.gov.bc.ca/cgi-bin/ttdr_brand_search.cgi”.
31. The unintentional additives derived from agronomic practices include soil bacterial flora,
pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers.
32. Unintentional additives must also be disclosed. The documents produced by the industry in the
state lawsuits are replete with incontrovertible evidence that the industry knowingly allowed
radioactive tobacco leaf to be incorporated into products headed for the unknowing consumer as
well as other toxic pesticide residues, such as ethylthiourea (ETU).
33. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (2002), at 26.
34. id.
35. Philip Morris, at 45.
36. Philip Morris, at 28.
37. Originally, the First Circuit ruled that Massachusetts’ Disclosure Act did not violate the Fifth
Amendment. However, the Court granted a rehearing en banc, reversing their original decision that
the Disclosure Act was constitutional. The First Circuit’s original decision holding that the Act was
constitutional, Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45, was withdrawn from publication.
38. The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads “... nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
39. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), at 124.
40. “Dispositive” is a legal term. Often, a legal question can be resolved only by looking to a
number of factors, all of which are necessary but individually insufficient to resolve the issue.
However, in some cases, legal questions can be resolved by looking to only a single factor which is
both necessary and sufficient to resolve the issue. If a factor, D, is both necessary and sufficient to
resolve a legal question, Q, then D is dispositive to Q. The claim here is that there is no single
factor which disposes the question of whether a regulation comprises a taking. Rather, one must
look to a number of factors: 1) the economic impact of the regulation, 2) the character of the
government action, and 3) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable
investment-backed expectations.
41. Id.
42. Philip Morris, at 41.
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
43. Federal Trade Commission Cigarette Report for 2001, issued 2003.
44. US Department of Health and Human Services. 1994. Report of the Surgeon General.
45. Id.
46. Pollay, Richard, et. al. 1996 The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market Shares
Among Youths and Adults, 1979-1993, Journal of Marketing 60 April: 86-93; Department of
Health and Human Services. 1994. Report of the Surgeon General.
47. See Fischer, P.M. et al. 1991. Brand logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years. JAMA,
266 (22): 3145-3148; Difranza, Joseph. 1991. RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarette to Children, JAMA, 266 (22): 3149-3153. See also Tobacco Industry Documents, RJ
Reynolds document, Bates # 500796976, 501431517, 507798137, 503273660.
48. See “http://stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htm#toc, “ Title I, section F.
49. The McCain Comprehensive Tobacco Bill incorporated the provisions of the 1997 agreement.
After this bill failed, 46 state Attorney’s General and the tobacco industry entered into a different
agreement -- the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). See note 9 for a discussion of the
MSA.
50. Philip Morris, at 27.
51. Philip Morris, at 45.
52. Philip Morris, at 44.
53. The GRAS list is covered under the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetics Law and specifically
under section CFR 21. This list recognizes the long-standing toxicity safety evidence in humans of
the ingredients and/or additives used in foods and cosmetics.
54. IRAC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) Acrolein, 1995, IARC Monograph
Evaluation Carcinogenic Risks to Human, 63: 337-372, Kuwata, K. et al. 1979. Determination of
aliphatic and aromatic aldehydes in polluted airs as their 2,4-dinitrophenylhydrozones by high
performance liquid chromatograpy. Journal of Chromatography Science 17, 264-268;
www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/acrolein.html, www.epa.gov/IRIS/toxreviews/0364-trf.pdf;
Toxicological Review of Acrolein, May 2003, Sittig's Handbook of Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals
and Carcinogens, Merck Index, Thirteenth Edition. In 1988, the industry commissioned an external
bio-toxicity study conducted by Battle Labs on glycerol, a key component of a cigarette (5-7%
w/w). The results of this study indicated that glycerol caused cellular disturbances in the respiratory
tracts of the animals tested and added to the knowledge base that when glycerol is burned it was
converted into acrolein, a suspected carcinogen, tissue irritant and a ciliostatic agent.
55. Biley PM Documents, deposition of Victor Denoble, www.tobaccodocs.org/biley_pm?
field_value+cardiovascular+system&resource_id=21049&field_id=198-19k, United States District
Court, Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana Division, 24 July 1996, see also Denoble, Victor, J at
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/may1.html[9/18/2009 5:08:53 PM]
tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/9/1/90.
56. Philip Morris, at 45.
57. See Minn. Stat. § 461.17.
58. Philip Morris v. Reilly, at 45.
59. Just because Smith buys property that is subject to a regulation, does not mean that Smith
cannot challenge the constitutionality of that regulation. Pallazolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606
(2001). In Pallazolo, the Court held that acquiring property after the enactment of a regulation does
not bar the owner’s claim that the regulation works an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 629-630.
60. Investment backed expectations were first discussed by Justice Brennan in Penn Central
Transportation Co v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For general discussion and analysis of the
concept see, Washburn, Robert, “‘Reasonable Investment Backed Expectations’ as a Factor in
Defining Property Interest,” Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law, 1996
(Summer): 63-96.
61. Francey, Neil and Chapman, Simon, 2000,"Operation Berkshire": the international tobacco
companies conspiracy, BMJ 312:371-374; see also http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/icosi.html,;
http://www.tobaccodocuments.org bliley_bw/681879254-9715.html; and Jones/Day Liability
Summary ("Corporate Activity Project") pages 130-139.
62. Hearings Before The Subcommittee On Health And Environment Of The Committee On Energy
And Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, June 21-
13, 1994, Serial No. 103-171.
63. Philip Morris at 36.
64. See notes 47 and 48, supra. For updates on U.S. government’s case against the tobacco industry
(U.S. v. Philip Morris, Inc.), see www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/, and www.tobacco-on-
trial.com.
_______________________________________________________________
Copyright ã 2005, Humboldt State University
